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Abstract 
This study presents robust empírica! evidence suggesting the existence of significant liquidity 
commonalities in the corporate Credit Default Swap (CDS) market. Using daily data for 438 
firms from 25 countries in the period 2005-2012 we find that these commonalities vary over 
time, being stronger in periods in which the global, counterparty, and funding liquidity risks 
increase. However, commonalities do not depend on finn's characteristics. The leve! of the 
liquidity commonalities differs across economic areas being on average stronger in the 
European Monetary Union. The effect of market liquidity is stronger than the effect of 
industry specific liquidity in most industries excluding the banking sector. We document the 
existence of asymmetries in commonalities around financia! distress episodes such that the 
effect of market 1iquidity is stronger when the CDS market price increases. The results are 
not driven by the CDS data imputation method or by the liquidity of firms with high credit 
risk and are robust to altemative liquidity measures. 
Keywords: Credit Default Swap, Liquidity Commonalities, Global Risk, Funding Liquidity 
Risk, Counterparty Risk 
JEL codes: G 12, G 15 
l. Introduction 
One of the key issues hlghlighted by the ongoing financia! crisis is the role of the shortage of 
liquidity in financia! markets. In this period we have witnessed severe episodes of liquidity 
shortage in many markets being this shortage especially noticeable in the Credit Default 
Swap (CDS) market because of the uncertainty about the net amount, the structure, and the 
counterparty risk of such exposures. As a consequence, many firms have had difficulties to 
timely manage their credit ri~ exposures. This situation posed important challenges at the 
individual leve! but also from a global stability perspective. These facts point out the 
importance of considering the extent to which the shortage of liquidity has spread over the 
different contracts traded in the CDS market, and the factors that affect such scarcity. 
This paper focuses on factors that may affect this shortage in market liquidity, and 
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specifically the extent to which liquidity commonalities in the CDS market are of material 
importance in this regard. Liquidity commonalities can be defined as the co-movement of 
individual liquidity measures with market- and industry-wide liquidity. The objective of this 
paper is to provide new evidence on the co-movement in liquidity for the CDS market, which 
was firstly documented by Pu '(2Q09), from a threefold perspective: first, the analysis of the 
time-varying behavior of the commonalities putting special emphasis on the financia! crisis 
events; secondly, the use of different economic areas and industries for the analysis of such 
commonalities; and, thirdly the analysis of the factors influencing this co-movement at both 
aggregate and firm levels. 
The typology of the participants in the CDS market, the high degree of concentration, and the 
role of credit derivatives during the financia! crisis affecting both the financia! sector and real 
economy make the analysis of the existence and the behavior of liquidity CO!Jlmonalities in 
the CDS market a topic of special relevance for regulators, risk managers, and investors. The 
' 
fact that the main participants in the CDS market are systemically important financia! 
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institutions (SIFis) facilitates that any shock affecting credit derivatives could revert directly 
on these institutions and could have implications in terms of financia! stability. In this line, 
Rodríguez-Moreno et al. (2012) show that the holdings of credit derivatives by U.S. banks 
affected their contributions to systemic risk, such that these derivatives behaved as shock 
absorbers before the financia! crisis but changed their role to shock issuers during the crisis. It 
is worth mentioning that the liquidity risk derived from the typology of the banks 
participating in the CDS market could be exacerbated by the high degree of concentration of 
the market activity in the hands of a few SIFis acting as market participants. 1 This high 
degree of market concentration may have implications in terms of the impact of large shocks 
on market liquidity. In fact, Mayordomo and Peña (2012) show that liquidity commonalities 
ha ve significant effects on the pricing of the CDS ofEuropean non-financia! firms and on the 
co-movements among CDS prices during the recent financia! crisis. 
The analysis of the determinants of the commonalities in liquidity is also certainly a timely 
topic because, as remarked by Dewatripont et al. (2010), developing a better understanding of 
what drives illiquidity at the individual and aggregate levels should stand high on the agenda 
of economists and policy makers alike. 
We contribute with severa! findings to the empírica! literature on liquidity commonalities. 
We document the existence of significant co-movements between single-name CDS liquidity 
and market-wide liquidity. Market commonalities are stronger than industry commonalities in 
1 According to a survey of U .S. firms by Fitch (2009), 96% of credit deriva ti ve exposu~es at the end of the first 
quarter of 2009 were concentrated in five finns (JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Margan Stanley, and 
Bank of America). In the same line, the European Central Bank (2009) reports that the five largest CDS dealers 
were counterparties to almos! half of the total 6utstanding notional amount in April 2009; being the ten largest 
dealers counterparties to 72% of the trades and the Bank of International Settlements reports that globally, the 
ten largest dealers account for 90% of trading volume by gross notional amount, being the 30% of the global 
activity generated by just one bank (JP Margan). 
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most industries, with the exception of the banking sector. The liquidity commonalities are 
still present when we analyze separately the CDSs of companies located in different 
economic areas, but the degree of commonality differs across them. Moreover, the liquidity 
commonalities are time-varying and increase in times of financia! distress characterized by 
high counterparty, global, and funding liquidity risks but they do not depend on firms' 
specific characteristics. In this line, we find that the Lehman Brothers collqpse and the Greek 
bailout requests triggered a significant increase in commonalities. In fact, the results suggest 
the existence of asymmetries in commonalities around these episodes of financia! distress, 
such that the effect on market liquidity is stronger when the CDS market price increases. 
Finally, we find that liquidity commonalities provide additional information relative to the 
three aforementioned aggregate risks around these periods. All these results are robust to 
altemative liquidity measures and are not driven by the CDS data imputation method or by 
the firms with the highest CDS prices. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review. In 
Section 3 we describe the liquidity measures and the methodology. Section 4 describes the 
data. Section 5 reports the empirical findings regarding the existence of liquidity 
commonalities. Section 6 reports the results of the determinants of these commonalities. In 
Section 7 we present sorne robustness tests, and we conclude in Section 8. 
2. Literature Review 
The Acharya and Pedersen's (2005) liquidity-adjusted Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
yields three effects, besides the covariance between the asset's retum and the market retum, 
that provide a characterization of the liquidity risk of a security. The first of these effects on 
expected retums is dueto the covariance between a security's expected retum and the market 
liquidity. The second effect on expected retums is due to the co-variation between ,a 
4 
security's illiquidity and the market retum. The third of these effects is that the retum . . 
increases with the covariance between the asset's illiquidity and the market illiquidity given 
that investors want to be compensated for holding a security that becomes illiquid when the 
market in general becomes illiquid. This last component is the common factor in liquidity or 
liquidity commonalities documented in the stock market by Chordia et al. (2000), Hasbrouck 
and Seppi (2001 ), and Huberman and Halka (2001 ). 
Our paper belongs to the growing literature on liquidity risk and follows the Chordia, et al. 's 
(2000) methodology to study the time-varying nature and the determinants of the liquidity 
commonalities in the CDS market.. Thus, the other two liquidity risk components and the 
effect ofthe liquidity·commonali_ties on the CDS premium are beyond the scope ofthis paper. 
Severa! methodologies have been used to study the existence of liquidity commonalities.2 A· 
detailed comparison ofthe different estimators can be found in Anderson et al. (2010). These 
authors distinguish two classes of methodologies for the estimation of systematic liquidity: 
(1) weighted average estimators based on concurrent liquidity shocks (the one emp1oyed in 
our study), and (2) principal component estimatots based on both concurrent and past 
liquidity shocks. Their results show that the two types of estimators are largely equivalent 
because the simpler estimators give, in most cases, similar results to the complex estimators 
under different evaluation criteria and liquidity measures. Following Chordia et al. (2000), 
we use cross-sectional equally weighted averages to construct the market liquidity measure 
employed for the estimation of liquidity commonalities. 
2 There is a wide array of variables to measure li9uidity but one of the most common liquidity measures 
employed in the fixed-income and the CDS literature is the bid-ask spread. In fact, Fleming (2003) finds that 
the bid-ask spreact· is the best measure of liquidity in the bond market. For this reason, the primary liquidity 
measure employed in our baseline analysis focuses on the bid-ask spread. 
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The existence of liquidity commonalities has been documented for many assets 
independently of the dimension of liquidity and the geographical area analyzed. The foremost 
market in which liquidity commonalities have been documented is the stock market (see 
Chordia et al., 2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; Huberman and Halka, 2001; Brockman and 
Chung, 2002; Dornowitz et al., 2005; Karnara et al., 2008; Kempf and Mayston, 2008; or 
Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008; arnong others). Liquidity cornmonalities across different stock 
rnarkets located in different countries have also been docurnented by previous literature (see 
for instance Brockrnan et al., 2009; Karolyi et al., 2009; or Zhang et al., 2009). 
There are also severa! exarnples of analysis of liquidity cornmonalities for other markets in 
addition to the stock rnarket. Thus, Chordia et al. (2005) and Goyenko (2009) document the 
com,monality in liquidity for stocks and bonds in the United States (U.S.) rnarket. Liquidity 
comrnonalities are al so docurnented by Marshall et al. (20 1 O) in the cornrnodities rnarkets and 
by Cao and Wei (201~) in the options rnarket. Cao and Wei (2010) find strong cornrnonalities 
in the option rnarket but these cornrnonalities are lower than those o f the stock market. 
However in the case of the CDS rnarket this topic has been barely addressed. Pu's (2009) is 
the first paper that considers explicitly the comrnonalities in the CDS rnarket. This author 
finds a strong cornrnonality across all liquidity rneasures in the CDS rnarket and a1so in the 
bond rnarket using rnonthly data frorn 2002 to 2005 for a sarnple of non-financia! U.S. firms. 
The method ernployed by Pu (2009) to extract the cornrnon factors from each liquidity 
measure is an asyrnptotic principal cornponent analysis. 
Liquidity cornmonalities in the CDS market are also treated indirectly in other papers such as 
Bongaerts et al. (2011) and Jacoby et al. (2009). Bongaerts etal. (2011) derive and estímate a 
model for the pricing of liquidity in the CDS rnarket. Arnong the variables considered is the 
leve! of liquidity cornrnonalities that is obtained frorn a principal cornponent analysis across 
CDS portfolios. The first factor of this analysis explains 16.6% of the liquidity variation. 
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Jacoby et al. (2009) analyze the existence of liquidity spill-over shocks across the CDS, 
corporat~ bond, and equity markets and find a dominant first principal component in the CDS 
market for the CDS liquidity measures considered. Other papers that study the determinants 
of bid-ask spread use market liquidity as an additional driver of individual CDSs' liquidity 
(e.g. Meng and ap Gwilym, 2008; or Tang and Yan, 2008). 
The aim of this paper is not to study the effect the determinants of bid-ask spreads but to 
estímate the effect of market liquidity on the individual CDS liquidity according to .the 
standard methodology of liquidity commonalities. We sháre sorne of the objectives pursued 
by Pu (2009) but in contrast to her analysis, our study is carried out using daily data that 
covers the recent financia! crisis and documents both the time varying behavior of liquidity 
commonalities and their dcterminants during this crisis. Additionally, our paper exploits a 
much more extensive database which allows us to deal explicitly with the differences in terms 
of commonalities of the different economic areas besides the US, and also to include firms 
from all sectors. 
Besides documenting the existence of commonalities in liquidity,_ other stream of the 
literature analyzes the drivers of such commonalities. In one ofthese papers, Coughenour and 
Saad (2004) find that the individual stock liquidity co-varies with specialist portfolio liquidity 
given that the specialist firms that participate in the stock market provide liquidity for more 
than one common stock. This co-variation increases with the risk of providing liquidity. The 
role of capital constraints on stock market liquidity commonality is documented by 
Comerton-Forde et al. (20 1 O) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) find that the effect of funding constraints is particularly 
important during market dówntums. Situations ofmarket stress have also been found to affect 
liquidity commonalities. Thus, Kempf and Mayston (2005) find that the commonality in the 
stock market is much stronger in falling markets than in rising markets. Brockman and Chung 
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(2008) find that commonality in order-driven markets (in their case the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange) increases during periods ofmarket stress. 
As Anderson et al. (20 1 O) suggest, the degree and variation of.commonality in liquidity could 
also be affected by the concentration of market makers and the type of trading. In fact, 
Kamara et al. (2008) find that increases in institutional ownership are associated with 
increases in stocks' sensitivity to systematic liquidity shocks. These authors show that during 
the period 1963-2005 commonality in liquidity increased significantly for large-cap stocks, 
in which institutional investing and index trading were more concentrated, but declined 
significantly for small-cap stocks. 
In the best of our knowledge ours is the first paper documenting the determinants of liquidity 
commonalities in the CDS market.at both aggregate and firm levels. We find that the leve! of 
liquidity commonalities is related to a large extent to global· risk factors and therefore this 
leve! seems to be a potentially useful instrument to monitor global risk. 
3. Liquidity Measures and Methodology 
3.1. Liquidity Measures 
Our baseline liquidity measure is the relative quoted spread (RQS), for a given firm j at time t 
defined as: 
Ask¡,t- Bid¡,t 




This measure has been widely employed in the previous literature and avoids any bias in the 
results due to the dependen ce on the leve! of the CDS premium or the degree of risk as could 
be the case when one uses the bid-ask CDS spread in absolute terms. However, to ensure that 
the results do not depend solely on the liquidity specification we use other liquidity measures: 
The absolute bid-ask spread (AQS) defined as the difference between CDS ask and 
bid prices without rescaling by the mid spread as in the RQS (equation (1)). 
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Number of contributed quotes m a g1ven day, which represents the depth of the 
COll§Ortium liquidity. 
Number of contributors: the number of contributors providing quotes, which 
represents the breadth of the consortium coverage. 
The gross and net weekly traded notional CDS amount outstanding and the number of 
d
o 1 
contracts outstan mg. · 
3.2. Estimation Methodology of Liquidity Commonalities 
3.2.1. Baseline market model 
As in Chordia et al. (2000), we use the following "market model" time series regression that 
is estimated by means of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS): 
DLJ,t = aj + fJ1j DLM,j,t-1 + fJzjDLMJ,t + f33J DLM,j,t+l + f34JDSM,j,t-1 + f3sjDSM,j,t + f36JDSM,j,t+l -1 
(2) 
where DL1,t represents the daily percentage changes of the relative quoted spread for firm j 
(RQS1,c)· DLM,J,t and DSMJ,t are the percentage changes of the contemporaneous market 
liquidity and market CDS premium, respectively, and are obtained as an equally weig~ted 
average of the individual percentage changes in the liquidity measure (DL1,t) and in the CDS 
prices (DS1,t) ofall the firms with the exception offirmj:
4 
3 For a single reference entity, the gross notional values are the sum of CDS contracts bought (or equivalen! 
sold) for all warehouse contracts and the net notional values present the sum of the net protection bought by net 
buyers (or equivalently net protection sold by netsellers). 
4 
The exclusion of one CDS avoids constraints on the average coefficients. If one uses all the CDS to compute 
·the equally weighted average, the cross-sectional mean of the coefficients is constrained to exactly a unit. The 
potential effects of cross-séctional dependence on the estimated coefficients due to the use of each individual 
liquidity measure as a .componen! ofthe explanatory variables for all the other regressions are investigated in the 
robustness test section. 
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Lf=ti,_¡DLi.t d DS Lf=ti,_¡DSu f . 
1 DLM,.t = an MJ't = or ¡ = , ... ,438 " n-1 " n:-1 (3) 
We use one lag and one lead of the market liquidity percentage changes (DLM,j,t- 1 and 
DLM,j.t+ 1) and the market CDS premium percentage changes (DSM,j,t- 1 and DSM.j.t+ 1). 
These leads and lags are uséd to capture any lagged spurious dependence induced by an 
association between returns and spread measures. Finally, DSft denotes the square of the 
CDS premium retum for firmj and it is employed to proxy for single-firm volatility. 5 The use 
of percentage changes rather than levels is due to two reasons: (i) our interest lies in testing 
whether liquidity co-moves and (ii) liquidity levels are more likely to follow non-stationary 
processes. 
We estímate equation (2) at two levels. On the one hand, we estímate the annual coefficients 
using daily information for every calendar year such that we ha ve annual estimations of the 
commonalities froni 2005 to 2011. On the other hand, we estímate the daily coefficients using 
1-year rolling windows such that we obtain a daily measure of commonalities on the basis of 
the one year ago observations. 
Additionally, we estímate equation (2) by OLS with a new definition of the market liquidity 
and credit risk variables using value weighted averages instead of equally weighted averages 
as it was done in equation (3): 
2 
(36¡DSwM,J,t+l + (37¡DS¡,t + Et,J for j = 1, ... ,438 · (4) 
where DLwM,J,t and DSwM,J,t represent the percentage changes in the value weighted market 
liquidity and market CDS premium variables. For every firm, the weights are proportional to 
its market value relative to the sum of market values of the 437 firms that form the 
5 
The average correlation between the square of the CDS premium retum and the percentage changes of the 
relative quoted spread is 0.03 what confirms that the volatility measure is not related to liquidity. 
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considered market. As we are using firms from different countries the market values are 
uniformly defined in U.S. Dollars.6 
The 438 reference entities employed in this paper correspond to 25 countries that we assign 
to 5 economic areas. Due to their heterogeneity, we altematively construct the market · 
liquidity and market CDS premium measures at economic area leve! (i.e., using only the 
firms that be long to the same economic area of firm j in equation (3 )). Then, 'Y e use these 
new measures as explanatory variables to estímate the liquidity commonalities by OLS 
according to the specification of equation (5). 
DL¡,t = a¡ + fJ1J DLM,i,J,t-1 + fJ2¡DLM,i.),t + {33¡ DLM,i,J,t+l + {34¡DSM,iJ.t-l + f3s¡DSM,i,j,t + 
{36¡DSM,t,J,t+l + {37¡DSf,t + Ec,1 for j =l. ... ,43~ and i = 1, ... ,5 (S) 
where DLM,i,J,t and DSM,i,J,t represent the percentage changes in the equally weighted market 
liquidity and market retums variables of economic area i. 
3.2.2. Market model with asymmetries in liquidity commonalities 
We next split up the contemporaneous effect of the market liquidity variable into two effects 
depending on whether the market CDS returns have a positive or negative sign. For such aim, 
we use two interaction variables obtained as the product of the percentage changes in market 
liquidity and two different dummy variables: (i) a dummy ( d~P) that takes value one when 
the market CDS premium is going up at a given date; and (ii) a dummy ( dtown) that takes 
value one when the market CDS premium is ·going down. We use the same methodology as 
in equation (2) but excluding the lagged and lead values of the changes in market liquidity. 
from the estimation such that the new equation is defined as follows: 
6 Market values converted to the common currency are directly downloaded from Datastream. This database 
uses the corresponding daily exchange rate to convert the market value in tne domestic currency to US Dollars. 
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(6) 
3.2.3 Two variations of the standard market model 
We first examine in more detail the effect of liquidity commonalities using both market and 
industry equally weighted liquidity measures. We add lagged, contemporaneous, and leading 
industry liquidity variables to equation (2): 
DL¡,t =a¡+ fJ11 DLM,J,t-1 + f3z¡DLM,j,t -t; {33¡ DLM,J,t+1 + f34¡DSM,J,t-1 + f3s¡DSM,J,t + f36¡DSM,J,t+1 + 
f37¡DS/t + {38¡ DL1,j,t-1 + {39¡DL1,¡,t + {310¡DL1,j,t+l + Et,J for j = 1, ... ,438 (7) 
where DL1,J,t is the percentage change in the industry liquidity, obtained using only the firms 
that belong to the same industry that firm j in equation (3). We consider 28 out of 41 
industries distinguished by the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), which is available 
from Datastream. 7 
We then test the hypothesis that the reference entities with the highest credit risk could be the 
ones causing the commonality effect. For this reason, we add to the explanatory variable 
group collected in equation (2) the percentagc changes of thc contcmporaneous (DLc,J,t), 
lagged (DLc,j,t- 1 ), and leading (DLc,j,t+ 1) high credit risk firms' liquidity measure that is 
constructed using only the firms that belong to the top quartile according to their level of 
CDS prices in equation (3): 8 
DL¡,t =a¡+ fJ1j DLM,J,t-1 + f3z¡DLM,J,t + f33J DLM,J,t+1 + f34¡DSM,j,t-1 + /3s¡DSM,j,t + f36¡DSM,J,t+1 + 
/37¡DS/t + {38¡ DLc,j,t- 1 + {391 DLc,j,t + {310¡DLc,j,t+l + Et,J for j = 1, ... ,438 (8) 
7 No information on CDS is available for the finns of the remaining 13 sectors in the ICB classification system. 
~ The classification of a given firm among the firms in the top quartile according to the CDS premia is 
perfonned on an annual basis. Altematively we could use credit ratings instead of CDS premia. 8oth measures 
should give an equivalent stratification. Nevertheless, we use CDS prices because according to previous 
literature·(see Hull et al., 2004, among ~thers), the CDS premia seém to anticípate the rating announcements. 
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3.3. Estimation Methodology of the Determinants of Liquidity Commonalities 
We study the determinants of liquidity commonalties at aggregate and firm levels. To 
proceed with the former analysis we first estímate the individual monthly liquidity 
commonalities using daily information for every calendar month where the market model is a 
variation of equation (2) in which we do not include the leads and lags. of any variable; 
(9) 
We next construct the monthly aggregate beta as the median of the firm's betas referring to 
the contemporaneous market liquidity ({31,1 in equation (9)). Finally, we conduct the 
following analysis: 
Median(f31 )m = 7Jo + 7] 1 Risk Factorm + Em (10) 
in which we regress the aggregate betas for every month m on the monthly averages of three 
risk factors: global risk, global liquidity/ funding costs, · and counterparty risk in the CDS 
market. We use a robuiiit to heteroscedasticy OLS methodology to estímate the effect of the 
above variables. 
The analysis of the determinants of the market liquidity on individual liquidity is carried out 
on the basis of the daily liquidity commonalities estimated in equation (2) using 1-year 
rolling windows. Concretely, we use the sum of the betas for the lagged,· contemporaneous 
and lead market liquidity measures as the dependent variable. As the liquidity commonalities 
·are based on overlapping information, we run a Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression for 
every day in the sample to avoid time series dependencies and to exploit the cross-sectional 
dimension. The standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation using the Newey-West 
methodology. 9 
9 The number of lags employed in the Newey-West regressions must grow with the sample size to ensure 
consistency when the moment conditions are dependent. We use a lag length determined by the widely 
employed method of the number of observations raised to the power of l/3 that is equal to 12 lags. 
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Sum Betas u= o0 + .c51 Firm lnfoi,t .+ o2 Country lnfoi,t + Ei where t = 1, ,, , 1625 (11) 
Among the determinants of the co-variation between the CDS and market illiquidity 
measures we use firm and country specific variables. Among the former variables, we use 
proxies for the firm size, leverage, level of credit risk, and firm shares' squared retums 
(volatility). Among the variables referred to the country of origin ofthe firm, we use proxies 
for the volatility of the stock indexes and 3-month interbank interest rate. 
4. Data 
The data consist of daily 5-year CDS information for 438 listed firms from 25 countries and 
span from 1 January 2005 to 31 March 2012. 10 Dueto the variety of countries a~d to en~ure a 
mínimum number of firms in subsequent analysis we group them into 5 economic areas: the 
U.S. (236 firms), the European Monetary Union (E.M.U., 108 firms), the United Kingdom 
(U.K., 41 firms), Japan (15 firms), and Others (28 firms). 
CDS information is obtained from Credit Market Analysis (CMA), an independent CDS data 
provider that is part of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. CMA sources its CDS data from a 
consortium consisting of around 40 members of the buy-side community (hedge funds, asset 
managers, and major investment banks) who are active participants in the CDS market. CMA 
is found to be one ofthe more reliable CDS data sources by Mayordomo et al. (2010). 
The information reported by CMA includes: (i) bid/mid/ask CDS premia for the 0.5 to 1 O 
year maturities; (ii) an observed/derived indicator, which indicates whether the published 
10 The sample does not include sovereign or unlisted reference entities. The use of the 5-year n~aturity CDS 
contracts is due to the higher Jiquidity in these contracts. The reference entities belong to the following countries 
(the number of ftrms in ea eh country in brackets): the United S tates (236), the United Kingdom ( 41 ), Franc.e 
(35), Germany (24), "Japan (15), Canada (11), ltaly (9), the Netherlands (9), Switzerland (7), Australia (6), 
Finland (6), Spain (6), Sweden (6), Hong Kong (5), South Korea (4), Belgium (3), Malaysia (3), Portugal (3), 
Ireland (2), Singapore (2), Austria (1 ), Denmark ( 1 ), Greece (1 ), New Zealand ( 1 ), and Norway ( 1 ). 
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leve! was observed in the ~arket or implied through a model using recently obsérved 
quotes; 11 (iii) the number of contributors, which is the number of contributors providing 
quotes; (iv) contributed quotes, which reports the number of contributed quotes on a given 
day. The number of contributors and quotes is only available from June 2008. The nature of 
the CMA data supposes an advantage for the use of the bid-ask spread as a measure of 
liquidity, in addition to the other me.asures employed in the robustness test, because of the use 
of information from the buy-sell sides. 
The information for the gross and net notional CDS amount and the number of contracts 
outstanding for each reference firm is obtained from the Depository Trust and Clearing 
Corporation's (DTCC). These data are only available for 399 of the 438 firms since 
November 2008 and with a weekly frequency. 
Next, we briefly describe the information employed to construct the remaining variables and 
their sources. Infom1ation referrin,g to global risk, which is proxied by the implied volatility 
index (VIX), is obtained from Reuters. 12 Due to the difficulty in obtaining data on 
institutional-level funding constraints, we proxy the funding costs by means ofthe difference 
between the 90-day U.S. AA-rated commercial paper interest rates for the financia! 
companics and thc 90-day U.S. T-bill which should be a proxy for the funding cost faced by 
AAA-rated financia! investors. Both rates jointly with the 3-month interbank rate and the 
country stock indexes are obtained from Datastream. As in Arce et al. (20 12), we compute 
the proxy for counterparty risk by means of the .first principal component obtained from the 
CDS premium of the main banks acting as dealers in the market. The information on the 
11 
CMA considers a CDS price as observed when they receive three different prices from at least two members 
of its consortiUm. The CDS prices that do not fulfill this principie become derived prices. 
12 According to Lustig et al. (20 11) "the VIX seems like a good proxy for the global risk factor. The VIX is 
highly correlated with similar volatility índices abroad". 
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banks CDSs is obtained from CMA. The first principal component series shóüld reflect the 
common default probability that is an aggregate measure of counterparty risk. 13 The 
information on the- firms' stock prices, market capitalizati on, total debt and total assets is 
obtained from Datastream. 
Table 1 summarizes the most salient features of the descriptive statistics for related 
information to the sample of CDS contracts. For the sake. of brevity we focus on the annual 
cross-sectional average of the mean, median and standard deviation (SD) from 2005 to 2011. 
. ' 
We al so provide information about 2012 which refers to the first quarter of that year. Looking 
at the CDS premium levels, we observe a gradual increase in the levefs and their volatilities 
from 2005 to 2009 and this behavior is common in both the total sa.mple and in the economic 
areas. In 201 O CDS prices perform on average a generalized drop. Average CDS prices 
increase again in al1 economic areas apart from the U.S. in 2011 as a consequence of the 
deterioration of the economic situation worldwide and especia11y in Europe. 
Focusing on the bid-ask spreads, measured in basis points, their behavior is in line with the 
CDS premium levels. Looking at the relative bid-ask spread, measured in percentage over 
average price, we observe a gradual decrease in levels and volatilities from 2005 to 2011. lt 
implies that the liquidity in the CDS market tends to increase and its volatility to decrease 
what is consistent with the. market growing in size over time. Table 1 also contains the 
squared of the CDS returns, which is used as a proxy of the individual volatility. We observe 
that the higher average volatility is achieved in 2007 and 2008. 
< Insert Table 1 here > 
Regarding additional properties of the daily percentage changes of the relative bid-ask 
spreads (DLj,t) employed in equation (2), this variable is equal to zero (no changes in the 
11 We use the 14 main banks acting as dealers in the CDS market. The first PC for the series of CDS prices of 
the previous dealers explains 90% of the total variance. 
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leve) of liquidity) for around 10% of the total number of observations. This occurs mainly at 
the beginning of the sample coinciding with the early stages of the CDS market. This figure 
supports the idea that results are not driven by the leve) of persistence in DL¡,t· In fact, the 
average autocorrelation of DL¡,t is around -0.3 which suggests that autocorrelation is hardly a 
relevant issue in our analysis. 
5. Empirical Findings 
5.1. Basic Empirical Evidence 
We first test the co-variation between single-name CDS Iiquidity and CDS market-wide 
liquidity per calendar year. Table 2 reports the results for the estimation of equation (2) 
showing the .cross-sectional averages of the slopes of the contemporaneous, lagged, and 
leading markct liquidity measures and the t-statistics over the 438 firms in our sample. 14 The 
table also includes the proportion of individual posiiive slopes and the proportion of 
individual positive and significant (critica) value 5%) coefficients. Finally, we report the 
"sum" and "median", which refer to the cross-sectional average and median of the sum of the 
contemporaneous, lead, and lag betas, respectively. The coefficients are estimated year by 
year from 2005 to 201 l. 15 
The results show a positive and significant contemporaneous effect of the CDS market 
liquidity variables on the individual liquidity measure, while the magnitude of the lagged and 
leading coefficients is much lower and the number of significant coefficients only exceeds 
14 Given that the individual disturbances in equation (2) are probably not normally distributed it is safer to 
concentra te on the average cross-sectional results, the distribution of which is probably e lose to Gaussian under 
some mild conditions. 
15 We do not estimate the commonalities in liquidity for 2012 because we only have information for the first 
quarter. However, we use the information of year 2012 in the la ter rolling windows estimation. 
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11% in 2010. 16 The contemporaneous effect reaches its maximum values in 2007 and 2008 
(0.82 and 0.86, respectively), both of them being highly significant. High significant values 
are also found in 2010 and 2011 (0.78 and 0.79, respectively). On the other hand, the 
mínimum effect ofthe liquidity commonality occurs in 2005 (0.57) and 2006 (0.59). 
On the basis of the sum of the three coefficients we find a positive and significant effect of 
the CDS market liquidity on the individual liquidity measures over the eight years of the 
sample. The median follows the same trend but the estimated levels are lower. The 
explanatory power as measured by the R-squared is not very high, ranging from 4% in 2005 
to 9% in 201 O, but it is in line with other papers using the same methodology, such as 
Chordia et al. 's (2000) analysis of the stock market commonalities. This fact suggests that 
there are additional explanatory variables that this methodology is not identifying. An 
interesting result is the trend observed in the 1iquidity commonalities which seem to evolve 
over time according to the economic conditions. It suggests that liquidity commonalities 
could be state-dependent as it is documented in Figure 1, which contains the cross-sectional 
median of the sum of the contemporaneous, lead and lag daily coefficients using 1-year 
rolling windows. Note that in the subsequent analysis we use the median to avoid any 
potential extreme betas, although the correlation between the median and average betas 
obtained in the baseline analysis is equal to 0.95. 
< Insert Tablc 2 here > 
Panel A of Figure 1 shows the median of the sum of liquidity commonalities from 2006 to 
2012 obtained using the baseline methodology (equation (2)) andan alternative methodology 
111 In sorne years such as 2005, 2006, and 2009 only 19, 14, and 28% of contemporaneous coefficients are 
positive and significant, respectively. The maximum leve! of significance is achieved in 2008 (70%). 
Nevertheless, this significance is not the one that determines the leve! of significance of liquidity commonalities 
but the one referred to the aggregate ("Sum") effect whose t-statistic is shown at the bottom of this· Table 2. 
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in which market measures are constructed by means of value weighted averages by firm 
capitalization (equation (4)). The first comment that applies is that both methods for 
computing the market measures give similar trends given that the correlation between the two 
measures is 0.94. The baseline methodology gives systematically stronger liquidity 
commonalities befare January 2008. After this date, the commonalities are larger under the 
equally weighted specification but the differences are smaller than befare January 2008. After 
thc Grcek's bailout requests, both methodologies provide very similar levels. A potential 
cxplanation is that thc liquidity of sorne largc firms is not rcprcsentative of thc market 
liquidity, especially befare the main episodes of high risk, and so the co-variation of other 
CDS contracts with the new market liquidity measure decreases. 
Looking at thc baseline specification we observe that the lowest levels of liquidity 
commonalities occur during year 2006, which is a tranquil period. During the whole year 
2007 there is a monotonic increasing trend. The high liquidity commonalities reached by the 
end of 2007 pcrsist until summer 2009 whcn there is a decrease that persists until thc end of 
the year. The levels of commonalities remain relatively constant until March 201 O. From this 
date commonalities exhibit a remarkable increase that reaches its maximum válue around 
May 2010, coinciding with the Greek rescue, and remains high until March 2011 when there 
is a signifícant drop. A ncw increase is observed by June-July 2011 coinciding with the 
European Council of 21st July in which there was a failure to arrivc at a clearly articulatcd 
and adcquatcly funded agrcement to guarantee the viability of Greece's public finances. 
Liquidity commonalities remain around this level until the end ofthe sample. 
In view of the pattem of the commonalities in liquidity, we next study whether there are 
significant changes around two relevant events related to the so-called subprime crisis 
(Lehman Brothers' collapse on September 151\ 2008) and sovereign debt crisis (Greek's 
bailout requests on April 23rd, 201 O); on the basis of the liquidity commonalities obtained in 
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the baseline analysis ( equation (2)). For such aim, we carry out a mean test com.paring the 
average of the liquidity commonalities óne month before and after the relevant event. We 
find significant increases in liquidity commonalities after the two considered events 
supporting the idea that co-movements in liquidity strengthen around global shocks: 
. We next check whether the liquidity commonalities depend on severa! firm dimensions such 
as the size, the level of credit risk and the leverage. For such aim we stratify' the liquidity 
commonality effects (the sum ofthe lagged, contemporaneous, and leading betas) in quartiles 
on the basis of the level of the three previous dimensions and check whether there are 
differences across the different stratified groups. Results are summarized in Panels B to D of 
Figure l. We do not find a clear relation between the firm's total assets defined in USO (size) 
and the degree of liquidity commonality (see Panel B). Thus, the evidence does not support 
the hypotheses that the largest or the smallest firms have different liquidity commonalities. 
As in the case of size stratification, Panel C shows that there is not a clear relation between 
the leve! of credit risk and the effect of market liquidity. The fírms with a stronger 
dependence on market liquidity do not necessarily exhibit higher levels of CDS prices. The 
same result is obtained in Panel D when firms are stratified according to their leverage 
defined as the ratio of total debt relative to total assets. 
< lnsert Figure 1 here > 
5.2. Empirical Evidence by Economic Area 
Due to the heterogeneity of countries (25 in total), we altematively construct the market 
liquidity and CDS premium measures at economic area leve!. The countries are then grouped 
into 5 economic areas. The cross-sectional median of the aggregate liquidity commonalities 
for each economic area are reported in Figure 2. Liquidity commonalities are still present 
when the analysis is carried out at economic area leve! but the degree of co-movement varies 
across economic areas. The highest leve! of liquidity commonalities in U.S. and U.K. 
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corresponds to the first quarter of2008 and May 2010 while the highest levels in the E.M.U. 
are reached after summer 2011 coinciding with the one of the hardest stages in the European 
sovereign debt crisis; In Japan the highest commonalities are reached in summer 2008 while 
in Others we do not observe a remarkable strength in commonalities. 
As in the baseline estimation, we test whether there are significant changes in the liquidity 
commonalities at economic area leve! around the Lehman Brothers' and Greek's episodes 
through a test of means. After the Lehman Brothers' collapse the liquidity commonalities in 
the U.S., E.M.U. and U.K. significantly increase while there are not significant impacts on 
Japan and the Others economic areas. After the Greek's bailout requests, the leve! of 
commonalities increases significantly in the U.S. and U.K. from 0.4 to l. This event also 
affects significantly to the leve! of commonalities in the E.M. U area but the in crease was of a 
lower magnitude, mainly because liquidity commonalities were much higher there than in 
other economic areas prior to this event. The effect of this event on Japanese firms is also 
positive and significant. Summing up, liquidity commonalities at economic area level 
significantly react to the main episodes of the subprime and sovere1gn crisis. The U.S. 
economic area seems to be the most sensitive to the events. 
< Insert Figure 2 here > 
5.3. Asymmetries in Liquidity Commonalities 
In this section we test the existence of asymmetries in liquidity commonalities. Concretely we 
study whether the leve! of liquidity commonalities depends on the upward or downward trend 
of the CDS prices. Results are shown in Figure 3. This figure shows that liquidity 
commonalities when the market CDS premium increases are larger around certaih specific 
cvcnts. Thc first date for which this bchavior is observed is December 2006 - March 2007. 
The second episode around which this phenomenon is found is the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. The two most significant episodes in which we find this asymmetric effect in 
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commonalities are around May 2010 and July 2010, coinciding with the rescue ofGreece and 
the European Council of 21st July. These results suggest the existence of asymmetries in 
commonalities around financia! distress episodes such that the effect of market liquidity is 
stronger when the CDS market price increases, meaning that commonalities based on the 
information for these dates could be more informative around specific risky events. 17 
< Insert Figure 3 here > 
5.4. Industry and high CDS firms effects 
We first differentiat~ market liquidity from industry liquidity commonalities according to 
equation (7). Table 3 reports the annual results referring to the liquidity commonalities to be 
compared with those obtained in Table 2. We find that the market commonality is stronger 
than the industry commonality but lower than in the baseline analysis because it is split up 
into the market and industry effects. Attending to the sum of the lagged, current, and lcading 
coefficients, the industry commonality remains almost constant from 2005 to 2007 and 
increases in 2008 to remain almost invariable up to 2011. However, we find a significant 
increase in the market commonality from 2005 to 2007 anda decrease in 2008 and 2009 that 
are consistent with those obtained in Table 2. We obtain a new increase in the effect of 
market liquidity commonalities in 2010 followed by a decrease in 2011. 
< Insert Table 3 here > 
We also test whether this pattern is common for all industries by stratifying the results at 
industry leve! and find that the banking industry is the only sector in which industry liquidity 
17 We check the correlations between the variable for the market returns and the two market liquidity measures 
that represent both types of asymmetries and find that they are 0.40 and -0.45 for the up and down market 
retums references, respective! y. Thus, there are not problems of collinearity derived from the joint use of market 
retums and the asymmetric liquidity measure. 
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is significantly stronger than market liquidity for all the considered years. This finding could . ' 
be explained by a strong effect of potential determinants of liquidity commonalities (such as 
global, liquidity or counterparty risks) that are specific ofthis sector. In fact, the main players · 
in the CDS market are banks. 18 
We also study this effect over time in'Figure 4, which contains the cross-sectional median of 
the sum of the contemporaneous, lead and lag daily coefficients of market and industry 
liquidity measures using 1-year rolling windows for all firms and for the banking and real 
estatc scctors. In linc with thc previous finding wc observe that market liquidity 
commonalities are stronger than the industry commonalities but the spread narrows from 
2011 on. As obtained in the annual analysis, industry commonalities in the banking sector are 
stronger than market commonalities for the whole sample with the exception of sorne weeks 
around summer 2011. The effect of the real es tate industry liquidity commonality is also 
interesting. In 2006 the commonality is driven by the market but this relation changes in 2007 
and especially in 2008, coinciding with the subprime c:risis, such that the industry 
commonality is significantly higher than the market commonality. This stronger effect of the 
industry liquidity could be related to the collapse ofthe U.S. housing bubble. 
We next check whcthcr the leve! ofliquidity commonalities is influenced by a certain number 
of influential CDS single names. Our hypothesis is that the reference entities with the highest 
credit risk could be causing the commonality effect such that liquidity is conditioned by the 
firms with the highest CDS premia. We study this variation over time in Figure 5, which 
contains the median of the cross-sectional average of the sum of the contemporaneous, lead 
and lag daily coefficients of market and high CDS liquidity measures, as estimated in 
equation (8), using 1-year rolling windows. The results suggest that liquidity commonalities 
18 Results are not reported for brevity but are available upon request. 
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are not driven by the liquidity of the reference entities with the highest CDS prices because it · 
is closc to zero during the whole sample. 
< Insert Figure 5 hcrc > 
6. Determinants of CDS Liquidity Commonalities and their Role as 
lndicat'ors of Global Risk 
6.1. Determinants of Liquidity Commonalities at Aggregate Level 
In Figure 6 we depict the time series relation between the cross-sectional median of the 
individual monthly commonality betas (equation (9)) and the monthly average global(Panel 
A), counterparty (Panel B), and funding liquidity (Panel C) risks. Each panel contains two 
figures showing the risk measures in levels (left) and in first differences (right). The liquidity 
betas on the one hand, and the global, counterpar~y, and funding liquidity risks proxies either 
in lcvcls or first differences on the other hand; are closely rclated. In fact, the correlation 
betwcen the liquidity commonalities and the global risk cxprcsscd in lcvcls and fírst 
differences are 0.42 and 0.43, and look similar to the ones with the counterparty risk (0.24 
and 0.43). The funding liquidity risk in levels also shows a high correlation with the 
commonalities (0.45) but it is much lower in first differences (0.03). Panel D reports the daily 
series for the three global variables in levels and the daily median betas obtained using 1-ycar 
rolling windows. This figure reinforces the strong relation between the liquidity 
commonalities and the other variables. The correlations of daily betas with global, 
counterparty and liquidity risks are 0.50, 0.56, and 0.35, respectively. 
< lnsert Figure 6 here > 
After documenting the close relation between the commonalities in liquidity and the previous 
risks variables, we next analyze formally their relation according to equation ( 1 0). We first 
• 
check the order of integration of the above variables. The monthly averages of the global and 
counterparty risks are integrated of order one while the global funding costs and the betas 
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senes do not exhibit a unit root. Thus, we use the first difference of the global and 
counterparty risk proxies as the explanatory variables. Panel A of table 4 reports the results. 
Th~ first thr~~ columns includ~ th~ df~cts of the thrc~ potcntial determinants of the liquidity 
commonalities individually. We observe that the liquidity commonalities' betas are well 
explained by the economy-wide variables. The first column confirrris that the global risk has 
a positiye and significant effect on the estimated betas. This variable has explanatory power 
as the R-squared of 25% suggests. One possible explanation is that the CDS market 
participants are strongly and homogenously affected by the shÓcks to · the global economy, 
given the high degree of concentration of the market participants in this market. This result 
could al so reflect the higher sensitivity of the CDS market to the global market factors. This 
result is in line with the findings of Kempf and Mayston (2005), among others, for the stock 
market in the sense that they find that commonality is much stronger in falling markets than 
in rising markcts. 
We next test how counterparty risk affects the degree of co-movement. The increase in 
counterparty risk could make it more difficult to find a counterparty to sell/buy protection, 
which lowers liquidity. The results of the second colurnn show that as counterparty risk 
increases, liquidity commonalities also increase. The explanatory power of this variable is 
lower than the one ofglobal risk but it is not negligible (16%). 
Another potential global effect to consider as a determinant of liquidity commonalities is the 
role of capital constraints. The effect of such constraints on stock market liquidity 
commonality is documented by Comerton-Forde et al. (2010) and Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009). We consider the capital constraints as a dimension of liquidity related to the 
overall funding constraints which should affect the investments in CDS. We find a positive 
and significant effect of the funding costs variable defined in levels. This variable has 
explanatory power (0.13) but lower than the ones for the two previous factors. The previous 
25 
empirical evidence implies that as the ·fimding cost increases, and as a consequence the 
liquidity risk also increases, so do the liquidity commonalities. 
In the fourth column we use the three variables at the same time as explanatory variables and 
find similar results in terrns of the degree of significance and the R-squared in creases to 0.32. 
The results are also robust to other specifications. 19 . 
< Insert Table 4 here > 
6.2. Determinants of Liquidity Commonalities at Firm Level 
In this section we study whether m.arket liquidity has a different effect depending on firrn 
characteristics or whether it is mainly deterrnined by global factors. To do that, wc study the 
deterrninants of liquidity commonalities in terrns of firrn leve! characteristics (leverage, 
credit-risk, volatility and size) and global levels of risk. The results for the estimation of 
equation (ll) are shown in Panel B ofTable (4). 
The firrn 's size measured as the log of market capitalization does not ha ve a significant 
effect. Chordia et al. (2000) find that liquidity commonalities in the stock market are stronger 
in large firrns, arguing that this pattern could be due to greater prevalence of institutional 
investors in large firrns. On the contrary, participants in the CDS market are institutional 
investors what could explain that the effect of the CDS market liquidity ori. single-name CDS 
is not significantly higher for large firrns. 
We a-l so study the effect of leverage, defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, and the 
leve! of credit risk, proxied by the CDS premium. The joint use of these two variables allows 
19 Similar results are obtained when w.e use another global risk proxy as the VDAX index. We also repeat the 
analysis using the mean betas instead of the median and we find that the economic variables have positive and 
significan! signs, although the estimated R-squared are lower. We repeated the re¡,rression using quarterly 
instead of monthly betas and obtained similar results. 
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us to control by the fact that the investors might focus on either the market information or the 
balance-sheet information to infer the risk or distance to default of a firm. The results show 
that the leverage and CDS premium do not affect significantly the relation between the CDS . . 
liquidity and the market liquidity. 
Finally, we find that the volatility in the stock prices measured by the squared of the stock 
returns does not affect significantly the individual betas. Thus, a larger volatility does not 
make the firm CDS liquidity more dependent on market liquidity. In ~um, there are not 
significant ctTccts ofthc firm specific variables in line with the results shown in Figure l. 
There are many potential global risk variables to consider in the cross-sectional regression 
analysis. Our aim is to consider the effects of the three global variables employed in Section 
6.1. Nevertheless, we can only include variables that are country specific being the effect of 
aB other omitted global risk variables, such as counterparty risk, collected by the constant 
term. The same applies to the global risk variable. However, in this case we can use the 
standard deviation of the country stock indexes to take into account the effect of the country 
risk prcmium. Regarding the global funding costs referred to the constraints that global 
investors may face, we use the 3-month interbank rate for each country given that there is no 
ihformation on the commercial paper for most of the countries forming the sample. 
As cxpccted in vicw of thc rcsults obtaincd in Section 6.1; we find positive significant effects 
for the two global variables employed in our regression. Additionally, the constant term is 
also positive and highly significant suggesting that other global risk variables lead to a larger 
exposition of CDS single-names liquidity to market liquidity. Thus, a change in the risk' 
premium equal to one s.tandard deviation would lead to an increase of 0.248 units of the beta 
referred to the commonalities. This increase is equal to 30.4% óf the average level of beta. 
An increase of one standard deviation in the interbank rate would lead toan increase of0.093 
units of beta, or equivalently 11.5% of its average leve l. Similar changes in the firm specific 
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variables have a more limited effect that never goes beyond 1.5% of the average level of 
liquidity commonalities. 
6.3. Liquidity Commonalities as Indicators of Global Risk 
We next check whether the cross-sectional median of the individual liquidity commonalities 
provides additional infonnational with respect to the aggregate risk measures around the two 
most relevant periods of financia! djstress (Lehman and Greek events) by means of a Granger 
causality test. This test enables us to examine whether past information of liquidity 
commonalities helps to explain the current behaviour ofthe risk measures and vice versa. The 
results of Section 5.3 suggest that the asymmetric commonalities referred to the increases of 
CDS market prices perfonn particular! y well around stress periods. Using an interval of three 
months bcfore and after the previous events, we first nin a Granger causality test between the 
baseline and the asymmetric commonalities and find that asymmctric commonalities 
l() 
Grangcr-cause the other measure around thc two cvcnts.-
Usingthis asymmetric commonalities measure, we perform the same analysis with respect to 
the global, counterparty, and funding liquidity risks and find that commonalities Granger-
cause the three risk measures around the Lehman Brothers' collapse but only the funding 
liquidity risk around the Greek's bailout requests. This result reinforces the role played by the 
CDS around the Lehman's collapse as shock issuers (see Rodríguez-Moreno et al., 2012) and 
suggests a lower effect of this market around the Greek episode. 
7. Robustness Test 
7 .l. Alternative Definitions of Market Liquidity 
The quoted bid-ask spreads suffer from well-known problems such as thin trading in the CDS 
market. It is not possible to use measures such as effectivc spreads as we do not have 
20 Results are robust to longer intervals. 
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transaction level information but there are sorne additional measures of liquidity that we 
cmploy in this section to estímate equation (2). Moreover, we use other methods to define the 
market liquidity rathcr than thc rclativc sprcads 21 Individual CDS and market-wide liquidity 
measurcs are constructed undcr thc specification of equation ( l ). 
Figure 7 reports the cross-sectional median of the sum of the lagged, contemporaneous, and 
lcading liquidity eommonality coefficients for the different liquidity speeifieations using 1-
year rolling windows. In Panel A we eonsider the number of contributors and quotes used to 
form the CDS prices as liquidity measures. Due to data avai1abi1ity, the samp1e spans from 
June 2009 to March 2012. We observe that the altemative 1iquidity rneasures provide very 
similar commonalities and in eomparison to the baseline ana1ysis they show even stronger 
commonalities apart from the interval between May 20 lO and Apri1 2011. 
In Panel B we use as liquidity measures the DTCC information about the weekly traded gross 
and nct nominal values and thc number of eontracts. pue to t~e data limitations the estimated 
measures span from Oetober 201 O to Mareh 2012 on weekly basis. We observe that these 
altemative liquidity measures provide similar commonalities among them but they are 
systeÍnatieally stronger than the ones in the base1ine analysis and this difference widens at the 
end of the sample.Z2 
21 Given that intraday data are not available and our interest is to exploit the daily frequency, we do not con~ider 
the measures of liquidity that are based on the co-variations in prices. For the same reason, we cannot use as an 
alternative liquidity measure the days without changes in the CDS price within a given month as in Pu (2009). 
22 Additionally, we take advantage of these measures of trading activity and estimate the baseline. specification 
using only thc more active firms according to the average gross amount outstanding of each single-name CDS 
o ver the period November 2008 - March 2012. Concretely, we repeat our analysis for the firms whose average . 
gross amount outstanding is above the median and hence, the number of finns decreases to 219. The trend of the 
new liquidity commonalities measure is in line with the ones obtained using the baseline liquidity measure and 
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In Panel C liquidity commonalities are obtained from (i) the absolute bid-ask sprcad and (ii) 
the first differences of the daily relative bid-ask spread instead of the percentage changes. 
Results are shown in Panel C. Up to July 2007 there is no difference between liquidity 
commonalities using the relative or absolute bid-ask spread. Then, the baseline liquidity 
measure exhibits stronger commonalities. Using the first difference of the relative bid-ask 
spread, the liquidity commonalities are systematically lower before 2008 and become 
stronger mainly during 2009 and at the end of 2011. Summing up, we estímate liquidity 
commonalities using alternative liquidity measures and in spitc of sorne diffcrences in Ievcls, 
the results are in line to the baseline estimation: strong liquidity commonalities that are 
sensitive to the periods of global financia! distress. 
< Insert Figure 7 here > 
7.2. The effect of the derived quotes on liquidity comiponalities 
Depehding on the intraday market activity CMA denotes the prices as observed or der.ived. 
Observed prices reflect idiosyncratic liquidity but derivcd prices could be influenced by 
market or industry liquidity. The r~ason is that when there is no information on a specific 
company CMA uses information from the firm's peer group, which is constructed according 
to the firm 's industry and rating. The percentage of derivcd prices o ver the total number of 
prices observed for the 438 firms and 8 years (823,878 observations) is 14.7%. We test 
whether the' "derived" liquidity measures, which correspond to the derived prices, have any 
influence on the liquidity commonalities. For this aim, we exclude the information referred to 
the derived quotes such that we only use the data p9ints that were observed and repeat the 
the leve! of the commonalities is on average larger than the one under the baseline specification. In the sake of 
brevity, we do not report the results ofthis analysis but they are available upon request. 
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baselinc cstimation as in cquation (2). Results are shown in Figure 8. The average leve! of 
liquidity commonalities for the whole sample period when using observed quotes is 0.63 
whil.e the average liquidity commonality in the baseline analysis is 0.76. The difference 
between these two figures is not significantly different 'from zero. This difference can be 
, explained by the imputed values for the non-observed CDS quotes on the basis of 
industry/market liquidity measures that could reflect a more general dimension ·Of liquidity 
rather than firm spccific liquidity put al soto thc use of a lower number of observations. 
7.3. Reliability of the t-statistics 
As Chordia et al. (2000) state, the reliability of the t-statistics depends on the estimation error 
bcing indcpendent across the equations, which is a presumption equivalent to not having 
omitted a significant common variable. The standard deviations of the average f3 
corrcsponding to the liquidity commonality variable are obtained under the assumption that 
thc cstimated errors in f3 are independent across the regressions and. we now test the 
reliability of such an assumption. We check'this following Chordia et al. 's (2000) method on 
the basis of the residuals obtained in equation (2). According to this method, we regress the 
adjacent time series of thc rcsiduals (i.e. wc regress thc residuals for firm 2 on the ones for 
firm l. thc residuals for fim1 3 on thc ones for firm 2. and so successively). The two firms to 
be used in each rcgression are selected by alphabetical order, such as they appear in our 
sample. Thus, we run 437 regressions for 437 alphabetically ordered pairs of the total 438 · 
tirms as follows: 
Ej+l,t = Yj.o + Yj,lEj,t + Sj,t for j =l. ... ,437 (12) 
where E¡,t is the residual obtained in the baseline estimation for firm j while E¡+l,t is the 
residual corresponding to firm j+ 1, which is the next in alphabetical order to j, Y¡, o and Yj,l. 
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are the estimated coefficients, and (j,l is an estimated disturbance. The t-statistic for 
parameter Yp is the one that determines the existence of cross-equation dependence. 
As it is observed in Table 5, we do not find evidence of cross-cquation dcpendcncc givcn that 
the parameter Yp is not significantly different from zero. Given that the correlations between 
errors are very clase to zero on average, the adjustment for cross-equation dependence should 
not materially affect the conclusions. 
< Insert Table 5 here > 
8. Conclusioqs 
Corporate CDS individual liquidity measures co-move with the aggregate liquidity in thc 
corporate CDS market. We present extensive empírica! evidence based on data for the period 
2005-2012 in support of this claim. The liquidity commonalities are still present when we 
analyze the co-movement of firms located in the same cconomic area, but thc dcgree of 
commonality differs across them being the E.M.U. thc rcgion with thc average strongcr 
commonalities during the whole sample period. Regarding the effect of market and industry 
commonalities, th~ effect of the market is usually stronger than the one of the industry in 
most industries but there are sorne exceptions as the banking industry. 
The liquidity commonalities are time-varying and increase in times of financia! distress 
characterized by high counterparty, global, and funding liquidity risks. Nevertheless, the co-
movement of the firm 's liquidity with the market liquidity does not dcpcnd on firm 's 
characteristics such as size, leverage, credit risk, or equity volatility but on global risk factors 
as the aforementioned. In this line, we find that the Lehman Brothers collapse and the 
Greek's bailout requests triggcr a significantly iricrcasc in commonalitics. In fact, thc rcsults 
suggest the existence of asymmetries in commonalities around thcsc cpisodes of financia! 
distress such that the effect of market liquidity is strongcr when the CDS market price 
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mercases. Finally, we ftnd that liquidity commonalities provide informational efficiericies 
relative to thc thrcc prcvious aggregatc risks around periods of financia! distress originated or 
amplificd by thc CDS markct such as Lehman ?rothers collap~e. All these results are robust 
to alternative liquidity measures and they are not driven by the CDS data imputation method 
(derived versus observed) or by the ftrms with high credit risk. 
Sorne implications for traders, investors; and regulators follow. First, our results are 
consistent with inventory risk being the main source of the commonalities in liquidity. 
Second, the CDS market has a high probability of suffering sudden changes in aggregate 
liquidity. Third, and given that the degree of commonality differs across economic areas, the 
expected returns on CDSs of otherwise similar companies located in different countries might 
ditfcr. Givcn that thc cxpcctcd retums before costs are related to trading costs; the higher the 
trading costs, the higher the expected returns. The more sensitive an asset is to the liquidity 
commonality componc1-1t, thc grcatcr its cxpccted return must be. Finally, rcgulators sho';lld 
considcr whcthcr thc standardization of the CDS contracts and the implementation of a 
Central Counterparty Clearing House would alleviate the CDS market's relative propensity 
for abrupt changes in liquidity. 
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Table l: Descriptive statistics 
Tablc 1 summarizcs thc annual cross-sectional average of the mean, median and standard 
dcviation (SD) of liquidity and crcdit risk measures for the whole sample ofCDS contracts 
cmployed in our analysis from 2005 to 2012. It is divided into six categories: Total, U.S., 
E.M.U., U.K., Japan and Others, where the former refers to the 438 sample firms and the 
remainder categories refer to the firms belonging to that economic area (the exact numbei- of 
firms is in brackets in the first column). Column ( 1) shows the individual CDS prices, 
Column (2) the quoted spreads, Column (3) the relative quoted spreads, and Column (4) the 
squared CDS premium retum. The CDS quoted spread (relative quoted spread) is obtained as 
the CDS bid-ask spread (as the ratio ofthe CDS bid-ask spread to the CDS mid-price). 
*Information relating to 2012 refers to the first quarter of that year. 
CDS Premium Bid-Ask Spread Relative Bid-Ask Spread Squared CDS Retum 
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
2005 74.1 73.2 16.6 7.4 7.1 2.8 0.15 0.15 0:05 0.003 0.001 0.01 
2006 65.0 64.3 12.2 5.2 5.1 u. 0.15 0.14 0.05 0.002 0.000 0.01 
2007 73.7 64.2 27.5 6.0 5.1 2.5 0.14 0.14. 0.04 0.004 0.000 0.02 
Total 200R 250.0 201.7 J36. J J9.9 1U 164 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.004 0.001 0.01 
(43~) 2009 32~.2 2~6.4 .!5 J.~ 21.3 J9.0 10.0 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.002 0.000 0.01 
20JO 201.9. J94.1 52.3 JJ.I J0.5 3.3 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.001 0.000 0.01 
2011 220.5 186.5 78.9 13.0 J0.4 5.8 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.001 0.000 0.01 
2012* 257.9 256.2 34.4 J5.6 J5.4 2.9 0.09 0.09 O.OJ O.OOJ 0.000 0.00 
2005 90..5 89.7 20.7 9.0 8.8 3.4 O. J5 0.15 0.05 0.003 0.001 O.OJ 
2006 ~o.:: 79.6 14.6 6.0 5. 7 1.9 O.J4 O. J3 0.05 0.002 0.000 O.OJ 
2007 95.4 ~4.3 35.4 7.2 6. J 3.1 0.14 0.13 0.04 0.004 0.000 0.02 
us 200~ 3 J6.2 254.ó J 73.4 24.5 Jó.8 2J 7 0.0~ 0.08 0.03 0.003 O.OOJ O.OJ 
(236) 2009 421.7 364.6 2006 2H 2J J JO~ 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.002 0.000 0.01 
20JO 254.~ 24J.~ 72.5 13.0 12.3 3. 7 . 0.08 . 0.07 0.02 0.001 0.000 O.OJ 
2011 244.7 2064 91.6 13.1 10.6 5.4 O.O!l 0.07 0.02 O.OOJ 0.000 O.OJ 
20J2* 289.3 2913 37.7 15.8 J5.7 2.8 0.09 0.09 0.01 Q.OOJ 0.000 0.00 
2005 53.2 52.5 Jl.2 5.0 4.8 1.9 0.14 0.13 0.05 0.002 0.000 0.01 
2006 46.5 45.9 9.0 3.8 3.7 1.2 0.13 0.13 0:04 0.002 0.000 0.01 
2007 48.8 40.2 J9.3 3.9 3.3 1.7 O. J2 O.J2 0.04 0.003 0.000 0.02 
E.M. U 2008 178.8 J44.6 98.8 13.1 9.2 9.9 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.004 0.001 O.OJ 
. (99) 2009 243.9 226.7 96.7 16.8 J5.6 8.0 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.001 0.000 0.00 
20JO Jó7.3 J65 7 38. J 9.1 R.6 3.2 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.002 0.000 0.00 
2011 24KO 207.5 ~9.9 15.2 Jl.7 7.6 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.002 0.000 0.01 
2012* 287.5 277.6 41.2 J6.9 16.8 3.4 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.001 0.000 0.00 
2005 62.4 62.3 12.6 6.0 5.7 2.2 0.15 0.14 0.06 0.003 0.000 O.OJ 
2006 52.4 50.6 10.2 4.7 4.6 1.6 O.J6 0.15 0.06 0.002 0.000 0.00 
U.K. 2007 57.9 50.0 20.7 4.9 4.3 2.1 0.13 O. J3 0.04 0.003 0.000 O.OJ 
(41) 
2008 J82.4 J47.6 96.3 14.5 10.6 10.0 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.003 0.001 O.OJ 
2009 212.0 J86.5 97.6 18.6 J5.4 JO.J 0.10 0.09 0.03 0.001 0.000 0.00 
2010 130.6 127.~ 25.1 ~.~ ~.6 2.4 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.001 0.000 0.00 
201 J 149.2 J35.0 33.5 J0.5 ~u 4.2 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.001 Q.OOO O.OJ 
2012* J 53.9 J 52.7 20.8 J 3.3 13.2 2.5 O. JO O. JO 0.02 O.OOJ 0.000 0.00 
2005 40.0 34.0 1~.2 7.1 5.3 5.1 0.26 0.25 0.07 0.004 0.000 0.01 
2006 35.2 33.8 ~U\ 6.0 5.5 2.2 0.23 0.22 0.07 0.002 0.000 O.OJ 
2007 31.0 27.7 9.4 6.3 5.5 2.3 0.29 0.29 0.07 0.005 0.000 0.03 
Japan 2008 122.5 95.1 74.5 20.8 15.6 J4.2 0.22 0.20 0.09 0,007 O.OOJ 0.02 
( J 5) 2009 J97.6 J41.0 J J8.9 33.7 27.5 20.1 0.22 0.21 0.08 0.003 0.000 O.OJ 
2010 87.3 85.7 17.9 9.9 9.3 3. J O. J2 O. J2 0.03 • O.OOJ 0.000 0.01 
201 J J03.7 94.0 28.4 J0.6 8.8 4.4 O. J J O. JO 0.03 0.002 0.000 O.OJ 
..,012* J 25.8 124.3 14.3 J3.1 12.8 1.9 0.11 O. J J O.OJ 0.002 0.000 O.OJ 
2005 56 9 55 9 10.4 5.9 5.5 2.0 O. J 7 0.16 0.06 0.003 O.OOJ 0.01 
2006 48.6 48.0 9.9 4.9 4.7 1.5 0.16 0.15 0.05 0.002 0.000 O.OJ 
2007 45.2 37.7 17.0 5. J 4.6 1.9 0.17 0.16 0.05 0.004 0.000 0.02 
Others 2008 J 67.4 137.0 82.3 15. J J l. 1 9.8 0.10 O. JO 0.03 0.005 0.001 0.02 
(47) 20()l) 17LJ.X 1 SJ.O XO.X 16.8 16. J 7.2 0.11 0.11 0.03 O.OOJ 0.000 0.00 
20JO 108. J 107.1 15.9 7.9 7.'7 2.2 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.001 0.000 0.00 
2011 141.1 116.8 47.9 10.9 8.4 5 .. 4 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.001 0.000 0.00 
2012* 175.0 171.0 22.1 14.8 14.0 3.4 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.001 0.000 0.00 
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Table 2: Baseline regression 
Table 2 reports the effect of market liquidity on firm-specific liquidity. This table summarizes 
the cross-sectional averages of the slopes of the contempo'rancous, lagged, and lcading 
market liquidity measures that are estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the t-
statistic. The table also reports the proportion of individual positive slopes and the proportion 
of individual positive and significant slopes ( critical value 5% ). "Sum" refers to the cross-
sectional average of the sum of the contemporaneous, lead, and lag betas. We report the t-
statistic for "Sum". "Median" refers to the cross-sectional median of the sum of the 
contemporaneous, lead, and lag betas. 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Contemporaneous 0.57 0.59 0.82 0.86 0.68 0.78 0.79 
. t-statistic 12.65 14.41 2l.68 26.36 17.96 24.68 21.73 
% Positive 76.48 76.94 88.58 95.43 80.82 90.87 86.50 
% Positive & 
18.72 14.38 44.75 69.63 28.08 53.20 57.21 
Significant 
Lag -0.02 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.02 , 0.04 0.02 
t-statistic -0.49 0.56 2.93 0.07 0.49 1.61 0.75 
% Positive 48.40 48.86 53.20 50.46 48.40 53.88 52.63 
% Positive & 
3.20 7.99 9.36 7.99 6.62 15.75 11.90 
S ignific ant 
Lead -0.03 0.02 0.07 0.02. 0.03 0.07 0.05 
t-statistic -0.60 0.44 2.52 1.04 0.94 2.25 1.90 
% Positive 47.26 47.95 54.11 52.05 51.60 59.13 52.86 
% Positive & 
6.16 6.39 8.22 7.53 5.48 11.64 8.47 
Significant 
Swn 0.52 0.63 0.97 0.88 0.73 0.89 0.86 
t-statistic 8.29 10.15 24.09 28.16 13.06 24.50 23.74 
Median 0.46 0.56 0.89 0.86 0.62 0.87 0.78 
Mean R -sguarcd · 
0.04 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.08 
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Table 3: Markct and industry liquidity commonalities 
This tablc reports the effect of market and industry liquidity on fím1-specific liquidity. This table summarizes the cross-sectional averages of the 
slopcs of thc contemporaneous, lagged, and leading markct liquidity measures; the contemporaneous, laggcd, and lcading industry liquidity 
mcasures~ and the t-statistic. The slopes are estimatcd by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). We also report thc proportion of individual positive 
slopcs and 'the proportion of individual positive and significan! slopcs ( critical val u e 5% ). "Sum" rcfers to thc cross-scctional average of the su m 
of thc contcmporaneous, lcad, and lag betas. We report the t -statistic for "Sum". "Median" refers to the cross-scctional median of the sum of the 

















2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Market lndustry Market Industry Market lndustry Market lndustry Market Industry Market Industry Market Industry 
0.35 0)4 0.36 0.26 0.59 0.24 0.60 0.28 0.40 0.30 0.51 0.28 0.46 0.32 
8.03 12.05 8.86 13.97 15.89 14.56 16.57 14.47 9.95 15.51 15.10 12.16 12.33 16.11 
0.66 74.66 0.68 76.94 0.79 74.20 0.83 76.03 0.70 81.05 0.79 74.43 0.75 81.46 


































































































































Table 4: Determinants of liquidity commonalities 
This table reports the analysis of the determinants of liquidity commonalities at 
aggregate and firm levels. Panel A reports the effect of aggregate factors where we 
regress monthly aggregate betas on the monthly average of global, counterparty and 
fundi~g cost risk, separately (columns I to TII) and jointly (column IV). using OLS 
robust heteroscedasticy. Panel B reports the effect of individual factors where wc run 
cross-sectional regressions by OLS for every date ( 1625) in the sample and calcula te the 
average coefficient which is reported in the first column. The standard crrors rcported in 
brackets are the corrected for autocorrelation using thc Ncwey-West methodology. 
These errors are obtained after regressing with Newey-West standard errors adjustmcnt 
the loadings on each factor, which are shown in the first column, on a constant. The 
second column shows the change in the dependent variable after a change in the 
explanatory variable of one standard deviation (SD). The SD is obtained as thc mean 
SD of the variable across al! the firms. The third column is the ratio between the effect 
on the dependent variable of a change one SD in each regressor and the average beta 
across al! the firms and over the whole sample .. *** (** and *) indicates that the 
estimated coefficient is significant ata leve! of 1% (5% and 10%, respectively). 
Panel A: Determinants of liquidity commonalities at aggregate leve! 
1 11 III IV 




0.091 *** 0.048** 
(0.03) (0.02) 
Global Funding Costs 
O. 155*** 0.092** 
(0.06) (0.04) 
Constant 
0.369*** 0.361 *** 0.306*** 0.326*** 
(0.02) (0.02} (0.03} ~0.02) 
Number of Observations 84 84 85 84 
F(l ,82) 26.59 JI. 18 7.9 20.8 
Prob > F 0.00. 0.00 0.01 0.00 
R-Sguared 0.25 0.16 0.13 0.32 
Panel B: Determinants of liquidity commonalities at individuallevel 
Coefficient 
1 SD change 




-0.002 (0.00) -0.002 
Leverage 
0.035 
0.001 (0.05) 0.002 
CDS premium 
0.000 
0.009 (0.00) 0.011 
Vo1atility stock price 
3.523 
0.012 (5.85) 0.014 
3-month interbank rate/ 
0.049*** 
0.093 (0.01) 0.115 
Vo1atility stock index 
32.939*** 




Average R-squared 0.03 
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Table 5: Reliability ofthe t-statistics 
This table reports the results of the test on the existence of cross-equation dependence, 
which affects the reliability of the t-statistics. We check this on the basis of the residuals 
obtained in equation (2). We run 437 regressions for 437 pairs of the total 438 firms. 
The firms to be included in each regression are selected by alphabetical order, such as 
they appear in our sample. For each pair of residuals we regress the residual of firm }+ 1 
against the residuals of firm }. The t-statistic of the slope of this regression is the one 
that determines the existence of cross-equation dependence. The first row reports the 
average correlation coefficient between the pairs of residuals. The second and third 
rows show the sample mean and median t-statistics. of the regression slope coefficient. 
The last two rows show the frequency of absolute t-statistics (for the slope) exceeding 
the 5% and 2.5% critica! values. Due to the existence of two tails, double critica! values 
( 1 0'~!(¡ and S'Yu, respective! y) are used. 
*Jnformation rclating to 2012 rcfers to thc fírst quarter ofthat year. 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 
Average Correlation 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Mean t-statisttc 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.03 
Median t-statistic -0.01 0.04 -0.06 0.02 ~o.o8 0.05 0.08 -0.03 
ltl>1.645 (%) 16.48 16.70 17.62 27.46 17.62 18.54 16.02 16.70 
ltl>l.96 (%) 9.38 11.21 11.21 19.45 12.81 12.59 10.30 9.38 
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Figure l: Daily liquidity commonalitics 
Figure 1 reports the daily effect of market liquidity on firm-specific liquidity using 1-
year rolling windows (i.e., cross-sectional median of the sum of the contemporaneous, 
lead and lag market liquidity effects). Panel A contains the baseline methodology in 
which market liquidity and returns are obtained using equally weighted averages and an 
alternative methodology where measures are weighted by market capitalization. Vertical 
lines refer to the Lehman Brothers (September 15111 , 2008) collapse and Greek's bailout 
~equests (April 23rd, 201 0). In Panels B to D we stratify the liquidity commonality 
effects of the baseline analysis in quartiles according to the size, leve! of credit risk and 
leverage. 
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Figure 2: Daily liquidity commonalities by economic area 
Figure 2 reports the daily effect of market liquidity on firrn-specific liquidity using 1-
year rolling windows (i.e., cross-sectional median of the sum of the contemporaneous, 
lead and lag market liquidity effects) being the market liquidity defined by economic 
area. Panel A depicts the cross-sectional median for all sample firrns and Panel B to F 
depicts the 'cross-sectional median for firms belonging to the corresponding economic 
areas (United States, the European Monetary Union, the United Kingdom, Japan, and 
Others, respectively). Vertical lines refer to the Lehman Brothers (September 15t\ 
2008) collapsc and Greck's bailout requests (April2Yd, 2010). 
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Figure 3: Analysis of Asymmetries 
Figure 3 reports the daily effect of market liquidity on firm-specific liquidity using 1-
year rolling windows (i.e., cross-sectional median of the contemporaneous market 
liquidity effect) in which we split up the contemporaneous effect into two depending on 
whether the market CDS retums have a .positive or negative sign. We use the bascline 
specification and interact .the market liquidity measure with a dummy for positive 
changes in the CDS market returns and on the other hand with a dummy for ncgative 
changes in the CDS market returns. We also exclude the lagged and lead values of the 
changes in market liquidity. 
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Figure 4: Market vs. lndustry Daily Liquidity Commonalities 
Figure 4 dcpicts thc daily cffcct of market and industry liquidity on ·firm-specifi~ · 
liquidity using 1-year rolling windows (i.e., cross-sectional median of t~e sum of the 
contcmporancous, lcad and lag liquidity effects) where industry liquidity. measure is 
constructcd as an cqually wcighted average of the relative bid-ask spreads · for finns 
bdonging to thc samc industry. Panel A rcports the cross-sectional median of all sample 
firms and Panels B and C refer to banks and real estate investment trusts finns, 
respectively .. 
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Figure 5: Market vs. High CDS Daily Liquidity Commonalities 
Figure 5 depicts the d<!ily effect of market and high CDS liquidity on firm-specific 
liquidity using l-year rolling windows (i.e., cross-sectional median of the sum of the 
contemporaneous, lead and lag liquidity effects) where high CDS liquidity measure is 
constructed as the equally weighted average of the relative bid-ask spreads of firms 
belonging to the top quartile according to their level of CDS prices. 
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Figure 6: Firm's betas and global, counterparty and funding liquidity risks 
This figure depicts the series of liquidity commonalities and global, counterparty and 
funding liquidity risks. The right hand side axis of the figures in Panéls A, B, and C 
refers to the monthly liquidity cor'nmonalities (i.e., cross-sectional median of the 
individual betas for each month) and the left hand side axis refers to the monthly 
average of global, counterparty and funding liquidity risks, respectively. Each panel 
contains two figures, on the Jeft, risk variables are considered in Jevels and on the right 
in first differcnces. Finally and regarding Panel D, the right hand side axis of the three 
figures refers to the daily liquidity commonalities (i.e., cross-sectional median of the 
sum of thc contcmporancous, lcad and lag liquidity cffects) and the left hand side axis 
refers to thc glohaL counterparty and funding liquidity risks in Jevels. Daily and 
monthly betas are cstimatcd according to equations (2) and (9), respectively. Global risk 
is proxied with the VIX; counterparty risk is computed as the first principal component 
obtained from the CDS premia of the main banks that act as dealers in such a market; 
funding liquidity is defined as the diffcrence bctween the 90-day U.S. AA-rated 
commercial paper interest rates for the financia! companies and the 90-day U.S. T-bill. 
Panel/\ Monthly Liquidity Commonalitics vs. Global Risk 
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Panel C: Monthly Liquidity Commonalitics vs. Funding Liquidity Risk 








Apr-06 Jul-07 Oct-OX .lan-10 Apr-11 Jan-05 Apr-06 Jul-07 Oct-08 .lan-10 Apr-11 
















.lan-0(1 Jan-O~ .l<m·l () .l<.Jil-1 ~ 






o o o 








Figure 7: Altemative Liquidity Mcasurcs 
Figure 6 contains the effect of market liquidity ori firm-specific liquidity using 1-year 
rolling windows (i.e., cross-sectional median of the sum of the contemporaneous, lead 
and lag market liquidity effects) for different liquidity measures. For comparability 
reasons, the baseline liquidity measure (relative bid-ask sprcad) is also dcpictcd in all 
panels. In Panel A daily liquidity measures are based on additional information 
provided by CMA about the daily number of contributors and quotes used to form the 
CDS prices. In Panel B weekly liquidity measures are based on the DTCC information 
about the weekly traded gross and net nominal values and the number of contracts. In 
Panel C daily liquidity measures are based on the absolute bid-ask spread (absolute) and 
on first difference of the relative bid-ask spread (incremental). Sample length depends 






Panel A: CMA Additionallnformation 
-- Baseltne -- - Number nfContrtbutors \Jumbt·r llf()u{Jfcs 
:'-itlV-09 Apr-10 Sep-1 O Feh-1 1 .lul-11 Oec-11 
Panel 8: DTCC lnform;lllllll 
--- Baseline - - Number ofContracb Gross Market Value Net Mnrket Value 
1 .2 









Dec-10 Feb-11 Apr-11 .lun-11 Aug-11 Oct-11 Dec-11 Feb-12 
Panel C: Akemative Speciftcations 
--Baseline - - Absolute Incremental 
Jan-06 Jul-06 .lan-07 Jul-07 Jan-OX Jui-OX Jan-09 .lul-09 .lan-10 .lul-10 .lan-11 .lul-11 .lan-12 
48 
Figure 8: Observed vs. Derived Quotes 
Figure 6 reports the daily effect of market liquidity on firm-specific liquidity using 1-
year rolling windows (i.e., cross-sectional median of the sum of the contemporaneous, 
lead and lag market Iiquidity effects) using the baseline methodology where both, 
observed and derived are employed and alternative me~hodology where we exclude the 
information rcferrcd to thc derivcd quotes. 
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